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INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT
TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A PROPOSED LOAN TO
THE KOREA DEVELOPMENT BANK WITH THE GUARANTEE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
1. I submit the following report and recommendation on a proposed
loan in an amount in various currencies equivalent to $60 million to the
Korea Development Bank (KDB) to be guaranteed by the Republic of Korea.
Interest on the loan would be at 8-1/2 percent per annum. The loan would
be repaid substantially in conformity with a schedule based on the aggre-
gate of the amortization schedules of sub-loans made pursuant to this loan.
The maximum repayment period would be 18 years, including three years
of grace.
PART I - THE ECONOMY
Background
2. The last Economic Report ("Current Economic Position and Prospects
of the Republic of Korea") was distributed under cover of R74-42 dated
March 4, 1974. An assessment of Korea's economic situation is given below.
The Country Data Sheets are included in Annex I. An Industrial Sector
Mission visited Korea in the fall of 1974 and an Economic Updating Mission
returned in February 1975 after completing its field work in Korea; their
reports are under preparation.
3. Korea's economic performance over the last decade has been out-
standing. In the period 1964-73, the GNP growth rate averaged 10 percent
a year in real terms and real per capita income more than doubled. The
rapid rise of output and an appreciable decline in the population growth
rate (from nearly 2.7 percent in the early sixties to 1.7 percent in 1973)
were major reasons for the rapid increase in income. A key factor in the
growth of the economy has been the increase of manufactured exports from
about $60 million in 1964 to $2,800 million in 1973. Such exports in 1973
accounted for over 90 percent of commodity exports and about 29 percent of
induistrial output. The ratio of exports to GNP rose rapidly from 4 percent
in 1964 to 27 percent in 1973 and the manufacturing sector as a proportion
of GNP increased from 16 percent to 28 percent in the same period. Agriculture,
which has had a growth rate of about 3.5 percent a year over the past several
years, declined as a proportion of GNP from 46 percent in 1964 to 23 percent
in 1973.
4. Rapid growth transformed the Korean economy from one characterized
by dependence on agriculture and sluggish growth in the 1950s to one of
dynamic growth based on increasing industrialization in the 1960s. Never-
theless, there have been problems. The two which have caused the Korean
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Government most concern are (a) the resource management problem, resulting
from a heavy reliance on external capital and (b) the question of distri-
bution of growth benefits, arising out of a faster productivity growth in
manufacturing than in agriculture.
5. Total real investment grew six-fold between 1964 and 1973, and
the ratio of investment to GNP rose from 13 percent to 25 percent. External
resource requirements also grew rapidly during 1970-71 averaging over 9
percent of GNP, roughly the same level as in the early sixties. The
marginal saving rate during the last decade was 30 percent which would
indicate that the large capital inflows did not weaken efforts to mobilize
resources domestically. Korea, however, entered upon a period of rapid
growth with a very low level of domestic savings and, therefore, in the
interest of rapid acceleration of investment and growth tolerated relatively
heavy dependence on external capital. In the early seventies when financial
difficulties resulted from bunching of payments due on short and medium
term debt and a sharp rise in the debt service ratio, the Government
took corrective action to moderate the rate of private investment, to
increase the inflow of capital on concessional terms from official sources,
to impose restrictions on suppliers' credits, and to improve the balance
of payments position through substantial exchange rate adjustments.
6. These measures, combined with a reduction in Government real
investment and uncertainty in the Korean business community about export
prospects, produced a marked slowdown in the economy during the 1970-72
period. Even with a continued high rate of export expansion (about 50 per-
cent per annum on average in current terms), real GNP growth averaged only
8 percent per annum during 1970-72, compared with about 13 percent in the
preceding three years. Real investment stagnated during 1970-72, and the
ratio of fixed investment to GNP dropped from 27 percent in 1969 to 22 per-
cent in 1972.
7. Although income distribution in Korea is generally more equitable
than in comparable developing countries, the benefits of economic growth
have not been shared evenly. The absolute gap in incomes between urban
and rural areas widened during the 1960s despite a massive migration to the
cities. Growth of labor productivity in agriculture has been considerably
slower than in the manufacturing sector. Since 1967, the Government has
attempted to raise farm incomes and to provide incentives for increasing
foodgrain production through a price support system for rice and barley.
These measures reduced markedly the gap between average rural and urban
incomes during 1968-72. Nevertheless, growth of the industrial sector is
likely to continue to be more rapid than that of the agricultural sector,
and the Government believes that, unless the proportion of rural incomes
provided by non-farm sources is increased, the disparity of incomes will
tend to widen. Therefore, the Government broadened its efforts to achieve
more balanced growth by pursuing policies of decentralizing industry and
emphasizing investment in the less developed regions, and in late 1971
initiated the Sae Maeul (New Community) Movement as a nationwide comprehensive
self-help program to increase productivity and incomes in the rural areas,
where nearly half the population still lives, and to improve the quality of
rural life.
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Recent Changes
8. During the last two years or so the Korean economic situation has
been subject to sudden and sharp changes. Beginning with the latter part
of 1972, the Korean economy witnessed an unprecedented boom. 1973 was
an exceptional year, even by Korean standards, and set new records of
growth in GNP, exports and savings. GNP grew by 16.5 percent in real
terms, primarily because of increases in exports and fixed investment.
Commodity exports, in nominal terms, rose by over 90 percent, denoting
an increase in real terms of about 60 percent. National savings, which
had dropped to about 15 percent of GNP in 1972, rose to 22 percent in
1973, surpassing the previous peak (1970) of about 18 percent. Foreign
savings were only about 3 percent of GNP and financed only about 12 percent
of total investment, compared with about 40 percent from 1968 to 1971. The
rapid rise in foreign exchange earnings, which included a marked increase
in tourism income, also reduced the ratio of debt service payments to export
receipts to about 10 percent in 1973.
9. The remarkable performance of the economy in 1973 encouraged
both business and Government to view the future with increased confidence.
In the latter part of 1973, Korean economic aspirations were expressed
in terms of targets of $1,000 per capita income and $10 billion of exports
by the early 1980's. The long-term strategy implied the continuation over
the next decade of the overall rate of GNP growth of about 10 percent per
annum but with reduced dependence, in relative terms, on net inflows from
abroad. At the same time, major structural shifts were being planned for
manufacturing. The objective of deepening the industrial structure was to
be achieved by emphasizing shipbuilding, steel, petrochemical and metal-
working industries, while continuing to develop existing industries such as
textiles and electronics. The long-term plan also provided for the achieve-
ment of parity between rural and urban household incomes by the early 1980's
through accelerated growth in labor productivity in agriculture and an
increase in off-farm employment by greater regional dispersion of industry.
10. The favorable economic developments of 1973 were interrupted by
externmal developments in 1974. The sharp rise in the price of petroleum
in late 1973, the recession in the Japanese and the U.S. economies during
1974, and the high level of foodgrain import prices have combined to bring
about a major change in the short-term economic position of Korea. Owing
to its poor natural resource endowment and because of its economic structure
and growth strategy, Korea was severely affected by these recent international
developments. Merchandise exports now account for about 30 percent of GNP
in Korea and dependence on the Japanese and U.S. markets has remained heavy.
A major element in the Korean export picture during 1973 was an expansion
of over 200 percent in exports to Japan, which was made possible by a very
sizeable expansion in total Japanese imports. Nearly 75 percent of total
Korean exports went to the U.S. and Japan during 1973. Korea was thus
particularly vulnerable to the recession in the Japanese and U.S. economies
during 1974. The revival of the Japanese economy and the future trend in
Japanese manufactured goods imports will probably continue to be major
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determirsaits of the Korean growth rate in the future, although the Government
is making efforts to diversify its export markets by encouraging sales in
the Middle East and Europe.
11. In the short-run, however, the higher costs of energy and food
imports have added a burden to the economy which is even more serious
than the setback to export growth. Korean dependence on imported fuels
is not only extremely heavy but is very closely linked to essential indus-
trial and transport uses. The passenger vehicle fleet is small, with only
one private car per 152 families; truck transport and diesel-powered rail
traffic are the basic transport modes for commercial goods. The higher
costs of petroleum added almost $800 million to the Korean import bill
between 1972 and 1974. Over the same period, the three-fold rise in the
prices of foodgrains increased foreign exchange requirements by more than
$350 million, despite a decline in the volume of imports. Korea is at
present importing about 2 million tons of wheat and about half a million
tons of rice annually, constituting respectively 85 percent and 11 percent
of total domestic consumption. Together petroleum and foodgrains accounted
for 36 percent of Korea's increased import bill in 1974 and 25 percent of
total import payments that year.
12. These international developments have greatly weakened the Korean
balance of payments position in 1974 and prospectively in 1975, slowed the
rate of growth of output and employment and increased inflationary pressures.
13. The current account balance of payments deficit widened from the
low level of $308 million in 1973 to an estimated $1,440 million during
1974, or by more than $1,100 million. The major factors in the deterioration
were an adverse swing in the terms of trade of 16 percent (equivalent to
a loss of about 5 percent of GNP) and a large negative balance on the
services account, due in part to a decline in tourism receipts. The
deterioration was notwithstanding a substantial further improvement in
real exports of about 10 percent, to a total of $4.8 billion, and only
a modest growth in real imports. The entire improvement in export volume
was concentrated in the first half of 1974. Real export earnings in the
final quarter of 1974 are estimated to have been six percent below the
corresponding quarter of 1973.
14. At current prices, total import payments (c.i.f.) are estimated
to ha-ve been about $6.9 billion in 1974, an increase of $2.3 billion, or
about 63 percent, over 1973. But in real terms, imports are estimated
to have increased by little more than 2 percent in 1974, mainly as a result
of decreases in imports of grains and capital goods, and only a small
increase in raw materials.
15. It is estimated that the net inflows of capital (medium and long-
term loans and foreign private investment) into Korea during 1974 remained
at the 1973 level of about $1 billion. Consequently, the increased current
account deficit had to be financed entirely through an increase in private
short-term debt, a reduction of external reserves, Bank of Korea borrowings
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abroad and drawings on the IMF gold tranche and first credit tranche and
the use of the IMF oil facility. Korea's net international reserves, which
stood at about $945 million at the end of 1973, had declined to about $90
million by the end of 1974. The rundown of net reserves enabled the
maintenance of levels of imports and economic activity in 1974 which otherwise
would not have been possible.
16. Notwithstanding the Government's policy, the impact of external
developments on Korea's domestic output, employment and prices has been
marked. In the first half of 1974, GNP continued to grow in real terms by
14 percent over the corresponding period of 1973, as industrial output and
real exports continued to increase and fixed investment remained at a
relatively high level. In the second half of the year, however, there was
a sharp slowdown in industrial output, private fixed investment and export
sales (particularly for textiles and plywood). The GNP for the second half
of 1974 is estimated to have been only about 3 percent above the level in
the latter half of 1973. Despite the levelling off of industrial production
there was a substantial build up in inventories of export products. Unemploy-
ment began to rise as a result of the combined effects of the industrial
slowdown, business failures and temporary closures. Between August and
November, 20,000 workers were idled. Failures of over 100 businesses in
textiles, ceramics and electronics were reported and more than 250 others
experienced temporary closures for varying periods. More than 650 businesses
partially curtailed operations. Open unemployment at the end of 1974 is
estimated to have reached about 600,000, or about 5 percent of the labor
force, compared with an average of about 4 percent in 1973. However,
because of less overtime, fewer shifts and partial workweeks, the real
increase in unemployment and the decline in real wages was much greater.
17. Imported inflation has led to a very sharp upward pressure on the
domestic price level. In addition to the sharply higher prices of imported
petroleum and foodgrains, the average unit value of other imports increased
by 45 percent during 1974. 1/ Consequently, the rate of domestic inflation
accelerated with consumer prices rising at an annual rate of 31 percent
between December 1973 and June 1974 and wholesale prices increasing at
double that rate. Since the middle of the year the rate of domestic in-
flation has slowed somewhat, reflecting seasonal factors, the slower
increase in the prices of imported goods and the dampening effects of
rising inventories of manufactured goods. It is estimated that during
calendar year 1974, wholesale prices rose by about 45 percent.
18. In general, the Government is committed to accepting necessary
adjustments arising from higher energy and other import costs. It was
1/ The unit value of exports also increased during the year, but by only
34 percent.
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not, however, prepared to place on consumers the full burden of higher
import costs of basic foodstuffs. Thus, despite dramatic increases in
prices paid by consumers for foodgrains, substantial subsidies are still
involved in the sale of wheat and rice. Complete avoidance of these subsidies
at a time of growing unemployment and declining real wages in manufacturing
was considered inequitable. Nevertheless, the Government intends to move
during 1975 to reduce the deficit on the grain account which has largely
offset public savings during the last two years.
Government's Response to Higher Import Prices
and Reduced International Trade
19. The Government began early in 1974 to take action to limit the
growth of imports. In January, the general exemption from customs duties
available for machinery imports for the export sector was eliminated. Taxes
on luxury imports and a number of domestically produced commodities were
raised. However, finished non-food consumer goods comprise a relatively
small share of Korea's total imports (about 5 percent in 1973), so there has
been limited scope for cutting down on non-essential imports. To reduce
demand for petroleum products, tax rates including tariffs on private cars
were raised substantially.
20. Because of slack demand, the burden of financing inventories
and continued increases in costs, a growing number of industries faced
serious cashflow problems in the second half of the year. This prompted
a number of mid-year changes in Governmental policies. The generally tight
financial policies in effect in the first half of the year were eased,
credits for imported and domestic industrial inputs were increased and
programs to purchase excess stocks and make available special credits to
smaller businesses were begun or expanded.
21. The Government in December 1974 introduced a set of special
measures to offset the sluggish demand for exports that had been experienced
since mid-year. It expanded the program of export financing and provided
loans for the stockpiling of essential raw materials. Credits to exporters
for the purchase of imported raw materials and domestic goods were increased.
On December 7, 1974, the currency was devalued by 17.5 percent to Won 485
per US dollar. The devaluation was not expected to increase exports appre-
ciably because of the depressed state of Korea's overseas markets, but like
some of the other measures, it was intended to improve the liquidity position
of manufacturing enterprises. It should also improve the competitive position
of import substitution indus,,ries which had been weakened during the year.
But the devaluation will also result in continued inflationary pressures
in 1975. Among measures taken by the Government to help the low income
groups are substantial income tax relief, a 30 percent increase in salaries
of Government employees and public works projects mainly in the urban areas
to alleviate unemployment. The rural areas appear to have been hit less hard
by domestic inflation. The terms of trade moved further in favor of the
farmers during 1974 as the support price for rice was adjusted sharply upward.
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22. The past year has been a period of very difficult adjustments
for Korea which, by and large, have been made quickly and with realism.
The Government rightly views some of its current economic problems as being
essentially short-term in nature. It assumes that a recovery in the growth
rate of OECD countries will take place in the second half of 1975, in which
event Korean merchandise exports could be expected to increase by 10 to 12
percent in real terms for the year as a whole. Private fixed investment may
remain depressed for some months but the Government intends to stimulate
business and employment through increased public sector outlays, especially
for irrigation, farmland reclamation, highway construction, housing and urban
waterworks. For example, about 87,000 units of housing, in addition to
the 112,000 units orignally planned will be undertaken in 1975, and about
334,000 new jobs are to be created in the public sector with hiring priority
to be given to unemployed persons in the low income groups. In addition
to increased capital expenditures, the Government proposes to continue
purchasing and stockpiling surplus inventories of such major industries
as textiles and plywood, for later release when the export and domestic
markets are more favorable. The overall budgetary deficit is expected to
be substantially larger than in 1974 and it is to be financed mainly by
borrowing from the Bank of Korea and from abroad. The Government is expected
to restrict the expansion of credit in low priority areas, raise interest
rates and increase the reserve requirements for banks to moderate inflationary
pressures. Essentially, the Government's strategy is to minimize damage to
the private sector during the current period of slack demand, so that when
international economic activity picks up the Korean export sector will be
able to respond. Excessive business failures and loss of capacity in the
private sector during the present slump would make recovery of the Korean
economy slower and more costly.
23. The considerable uncertainty surrounding the international economic
situation makes it difficult to assess confidently Korea's economic pros-
pects for 1975. The Government hopes that, with its antirecessionary
measures, aided by a recovery in OECD countries in the second half of 1975,
GNP in real terms may increase by 6-7 percent and industrial output by as
much as 14 percent. However, if the recovery in the export markets is
delayed, industrial growth would be less vigorous, perhaps in the range of
10 percent, and levels of unemployment and underemployment would be even
higher.
24. Even with a recovery in the OECD countries later this year,
Korea will face a large current account deficit estimated at about $1,700 mil-
lion. This estimate assumes that merchandise exports will increase by 10 per-
cent in real terms during 1975, that real import growth will be limited to
less than 9 percent, and that some marginal improvement (about 2 percent)
in the terms of trade will take place. An overall import growth of around
9 percent will permit 11-12 percent growth in petroleum, food and raw
materials imports and a modest increase in capital goods imports. With a
slower growth of imports it would be difficult to maintain an adequate
level of food supplies and to achieve the expected recovery of industrial
output and exports in the second half of 1975. Finding the means to finance
the large external deficit is Korea's most urgent economic challenge. The
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servicing of the sizeable foreign borrowing required should not pose serious
difficulties for Korea given the present low debt service ratio and continued
good long-term prospects for export growth, provided that the proportion of
added debt incurred on short and medium terms and at high interest rates is
not too great. Korean export growth, which in real terms averaged approxi-
mately 30 percent a year during the last decade cannot be expected to be
sustained at that rate in the future. Considering, however, that 90 percent
of Korea's exports now, and prospectively, consists of manufactured goods,
that its links with the Japanese economy remain strong, that vigorous
efforts are being made to penetrate new markets, especially in the Middle
East, and that progress has already been made in diversifying the in-
dustrial structure, a long-term real growth rate of exports of 10 to
12 percent seems entirely possible even if world trade in manufactures
should expand comparatively slowly. With the prospect of slower growth
in exports than in the past, Korea's plans already envisage greater emphasis
on import substitution in agriculture, especially foodgrains, and in
industry with special emphasis on increasing the domestic value added in
exports. Forecasts of developments in the world economy and their impact
on Korea which is so dependent upon them are especially difficult to make
at this time. However, given Korea's record of successful economic manage-
ment in the past 10 years and the skills, adaptability, vigor and invent-
iveness of its workers and entrepreneurs, one can be confident that ways
will be found to surmount the problems facing the economy.
PART II - BANK GROUP OPERATIONS
25. As of January 31, 1975, Korea had received 16 Bank loans and 8 IDA
credits, amounting in total to $517.2 million in loans and $107.0 million in
credits (taking into account cancellations and the refinancing of one IDA
credit in a subsequent Bank loan).
26. About one-half of the total has been for the transport sector -
$119.7 million for railways, $101.5 million for highways and $80 million
for ports. $130.5 million has gone to agricultural projects - $93 million
for irrigation projects, $7 million for livestock development, $10.5 million
for the provision of medium- and long-term credit through the National Agri-
cultural Cooperative Federation (NACF), $7 million for seeds production and
$13.0 million for an integrated agricultural products processing project.
The Korean Development Finance Corporation (KDFC) has received $95 million
in Bank loans for relending to private industry. The balance of $97.8 mil-
lion was for two education projects, a tourism project, and a secondary
cities regional project.
27. IFC has made six investments in Korea and its gross commitments
amounted to $21.1 million in loans and shares. 1/ It made its first equity
1/ A seventh investment in the Atlas Paper Co. amounting to $5 million
was cancelled at the request of the Company.
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investment in KDFC, of $0.7 million or 14 percent of KDFC's paid-in capital,
at the time the Bank made its first loan to KDFC. A loan of $1.4 million to,
and an equity investment of $0.3 million in, the Honam Silk Co. was made in
1969. In 1971, IFC purchased $0.7 million of the shares of the Korea In-
vestment and Finance Corporation - an institution whose function is to assist
in the development of the capital and money markets, a further investment of
about $0.3 million was made in 1974. In July 1973, the IFC exercised
preemptive rights and purchased at par about $400,000 equivalent of KDFC's
common stock. In June 1974, IFC approved an investment of $17.3 million in
the Gold Star Company Ltd. consisting of a loan of $16.0 million and $1.3
million in equity. Gold Star is a leading electronics manufacturer. In-
vestments of $9 million in Tong Yang Nylon Co., Ltd., and about $3.5 million
in Hae Un Dae Development Co., Ltd. for hotel development have been approved;
an investment in the Korea Securities Finance Corporation is under consider-
ation.
28. Of total Bank and IDA lending, about $278.1 million remained un-
disbursed on effective loans and credits as at January 31, 1975. The rate
of disbursements has increased in recent months. Annex II contains a summary
statement of Bank loans, IDA credits, and IFC investments as of that date
and notes on the execution of ongoing projects. As indicated in the notes,
progress on project implementation is generally satisfactory, although
difficulties have been encountered with some projects and most seriously with
the Pyongtaek-Kumgang and Yong San Gang Irrigation Projects (Loan 600-KO and
Loan 795/Credit 283, respectively).
29. The Bank's program for FY75 includes four operations in addition
to the proposed loan: the secondary cities regional project, a program loan,
a third education project and a fifth railway project. The first of these
has been approved, documents relating to the proposed program loan have been
distributed and negotiations on the two other projects have been substantially
completed.
30. The emphasis which the Government places on agricultural and rural
development will be reflected in the programs for the succeeding years FY76
and FY77. The report of the agriculture sector mission (R73-287, dated
December 19, 1973) provided the basis for developing additional high prior-
ity agricultural projects. A second livestock project, the second stage of
the Yong San Gang Irrigation Project, the Okseo irrigation and regional
development project and the Miho Cheon and Naeseong-Cheon watershed devel-
opment projects have already been identified and are under preparation, and
follow-on projects in agricultural credit and agricultural products process-
ing are also being considered.
31. Another major emphasis in Korea's plans is the development of in-
dustries such as steel, shipbuilding, machine tools and petrochemicals.
Hitherto, the Bank's lending for industry to Korea has been solely through
the KDFC. As indicated, a loan for industrial development through a second
financial intermediary, the Korea Development Bank (KDB) - a Government-
owned institution responsible for the largest share of term lending for
industry in Korea - has already been appraised. Also under consideration
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is a loan to the Medium Industry Bank which provides financing to sLaller
businesses.
32. The development of the industrial and agricultural sectors and of
exports will require concurrent infrastructural development. Although the
transport sector will be given relatively less emphasis than in the past,
the investments required are large, and thus there is considerable financ-
ing for this sector in the proposed program.
PART III - THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR AND INDUSTRIAL FINANCING
33. Korea's highly successful growth performance in recent years was
particularly impressive because it has a poor resource-endowment 
- apart
from relatively poor grade coal and some iron ore it has hardly any mineral
deposits and few sources of hydro-electric power. In the immediate post-
Korean War years the economy, which was then predominantly agricultural,
was sluggish; however growth began to accelerate sharply about 1963 and
has resulted in the transformation of the traditional economy into one in
which the dynamic industrial sector plays a pivotal role. The pace of
industrialization led by the expansion of manufactured goods exports has
been about the most rapid attained by any developing country over the last
decade. The output of the manufacturing sector has risen at the rate of
about 18 percent annually since 1963, and its exports which stood at less
than $50 million in that year rose to about $2.8 billion by 1973, accounting
for nearly 90 percent of total merchandise exports. The average annual
manufacturing growth rate during the last decade has been over 19 percent
per year and resulted in a rise in the share of manufacturing in GNP from
11 percent in 1960 to over 28 percent in 1973.
34. The industrialization strategy followed by Korea over the last
decade was based on a clear recognition of the limitations placed on it
by the country's relative lack of natural resources. It was primarily on
this account that development planning centered around the aim of expanding
the export of manufactures rather than concentrating almost entirely on
import-substitution as was the case in many developing countries in the
early sixties. One important ingredient in the success of this policy was
the fact that formal education during the fifties was at a level comparable
with that of countries enjoying income-levels three times as high as Korea.
This gave Korea the advantages of a skilled and adaptable labor force as
wel'l as the ability to quickly develop efficient managerial talent. There-
fore, Korea has adopted a policy of concentrating on labor-intensive indus-
tries such as textiles, clothing, electronics and plywood the capital
requirements of which are low compared to output. In this respect, it is
noteworthy that the great expansion of Korea's industrial structure in
recent years has absorbed only 20 percent of total fixed investment, that
the incremental capital:output ratio in manufacturing declined from 1.7
in 1968 to 1.4 in 1972, and that value added per worker, which is about$1,700, compares favorably with that in other East Asian countries (Philip-
pines: $600; Taiwan: $1,150; Malaysia: $1,500).
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35. The extent to which the Korean economy depends upon its light indus-
try can be gauged from the fact that, in 1972, it accounted for nearly 90 per-
cent of the exports of the manufacturing sector and about 80 percent of the
value of total merchandise exports. Exports of textiles, plywood and elec-
tronics amounted to US$950 million equivalent (roughly 56 percent of total
merchandise exports). The Government has, however, been making efforts to
deepen and diversify the industrial structure by encouraging the growth of
intermediate and heavy manufactures. Since 1970, over half the total in-
dustrial investment has been allocated to the basic metal, chemical and
petroleum industries. The opening of Korea's first steel mill at Pohang
(which has an initial capacity of just over a million tons per annum) and
a large shipyard at Ulsan (of a million ton gross capacity) are indicative
of a shift into more sophisticated lines of production.
36. Korea's long-term development plans are formulated on the premise
that the direction of its growth over the past decade, which lay along rapidly
expanding manufactured goods export, can be extrapolated through the early
1980's. In 1972 the Government prepared a macro-economic planning framework
for the 1972-81 period. This envisaged a rate of GNP growth of about 10 per-
cent per annum and the expansion of exports at a rate somewhat in excess of
this figure. Targets of expanding manufacturing output at the rate of about
17 percent per annum and its increase, as a proportion of total output (in
value added terms), to 40 percent at the end of the period, as compared with
around 25 percent at present, were also postulated. These quantitative goals
were to be achieved, in large part, by increasing the capacity of heavy in-
dustry which was expected to absorb over 70 percent of planned industrial
investment during 1973-76 and about 60 percent between 1977 and 1981.
37. The recent economic setbacks have led to a re-examination of these
objectives and the strategy formulated to achieve them. The revision of the
long range plan has not yet been completed, but it appears that the target for
the average annual increase in GNP will be lowered to 7 to 8 percent and
greater emphasis than formerly envisaged will be placed on increasing domes-
tic value added. Consequently, the rate of growth of exports will also be
lower than envisioned. However, one element of the new strategy which aims
at a change in the structure of manufacturing output and exports towards
heavier industries (shipbuilding, steel and petro-chemicals) will remain
essentially unchanged although the shift will take place more gradually than
had been anticipated prior to the increase in energy prices. Most of the
figures relating to the projections of exports, value of production and in-
vestment needs of various segments of the industrial sector given in this
section reflect the premises made in the 1972-81 plans which are currently
under review. However, it is not expected that any drastic scaling-down or
deferment of the investments proposed will be necessary. The allocation of
a greater proportion of industrial investment towards increasing the pro-
duction of capital and intermediate goods is a prudent move in view of the
trend towards protectionism in some of Korea's potential markets and in-
creasing competition from other developing countries with cheaper labor costs
which will tend to limit the opportunities to continue expanding the export
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of light manufactures at a pace sufficient to sustain the projected growth
rate of the industrial sector. For this reason the Government expects to
rely more heavily on heavy industry in the achievement of its economic
growth targets. Thus, it is expected that the export of the products of
heavy industry will account for a considerably greater proportion of the
total export of manufactures by 1981 as compared to about 10 percent at
present. Further, the proposed shift towards heavier industry should in-
crease net foreign exchange earnings from the export of light industry
products as a result of the reduction of the import component of the capital
and intermediate goods it uses.
38. Korea's plans to develop its shipbuilding, steel and machine tool
industries are illustrative of the proposed re-alignment of its development
strategy towards increasing the production of intermediate and capital goods.
The first steps in this direction have already been taken as pointed out in
paragraph 28 above. The commissioning of the Hyundai Shipyard at Ulsan in
1973 raised Korea's annual shipbuilding capacity to over a million gross tons
from the almost negligible figure of 63,000 gross tons per year previously.
Orders for the building of ten large tankers have already been received;
the first five tankers have been launched and one has been delivered. Korea's
favorable sites and climate and its well-trained labor-force will give the
country a strong comparative advantage in shipbuilding. Encouraged by the
demand for ships from the Hyundai works, the Government is considering the
construction of additional shipyards each with an annual capacity falling
within the 750,000 - 1 million gross ton range over the next decade.
39. Korea's success in implementing the first phase of the Pohang
Steel Mill (POSCO) project which came into operation in 1972 has led to the
formulation of plans to increase the production of crude steel by about
15 million tons by the early eighties. Financing for the expansion of the
Pohang steel mill to a capacity of 2.6 million tons of crude steel has been
arranged and the installation of a second steel plant is under consideration.
It is forecast that most of the increased output will go to satisfy domestic
demand which is expected to rise to nearly 9.0 million tons by 1981 as
compared to 2.6 million tons in 1972. Even so, exports of nearly a third
of total production may be necessary by the early 1980's.
40. Korea's imports of industrial machinery amount to about $700 mil-
lion per annum. The domestic machine tool industry's output is about $475
million equivalent; it operates at a low level of efficiency largely on
account of the sub-optimal scale of its production units and the poor tech-
nology they employ. Korea's industrial plans for the remainder of the
seventies will create a heavy demand for industrial machinery. The Govern-
ment sees in this expected development an opportunity to modernize and
expand the industrial machinery industry with the objective not only of
becoming self-sufficient but also of realising export earnings of about
$1.5 billion per year by the beginning of the next decade. This implies a
more than tenfold increase, by value, of the present output of the industry.
Accordingly, investments totalling over $4 billion equivalent to streamline
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existing plants and install new capacity are planned for the 1973-81 period.
Approximately 50 percent of the amount has been earmarked for a new machine-
tool complex to be located at Chang-Won (near Masan on Korea's south-
aastern coast).
41. The part which light industry is expected to play in the fulfill-
ment of the export expansion objectives, though less important than in the
last decade, is nevertheless still vital. In this connection, the textile
industry in which some 30 percent of the industrial labor force is employed
is expected to export goods of about $2.4 billion by 1981 as compared with
about $1.3 billion in 1974. It is estimated that the industry will need an
investment of about $2.7 billion over the next decade in order to expand its
capacity sufficiently to meet this goal. The 1981 export target for the
buoyant electronics industry is of the order of about $5 billion; it is
expected to absorb nearly $1.5 billion in additional investment over the
next six to seven years.
42. The major re-structuring and expansion of Korea's industrial sector
will require a heavy outlay of capital. Tentative figures indicate that the
investment needs of major industries for the 1973-81 period could amount to
as much as $15 billion equivalent. The Government has embarked on a major
effort to mobilize the funds required by increasing domestic savings. A
National Investment Fund (NIF) Law was enacted in December 1973. The Minister
of Finance is in charge of the Fund but in effect delegates its management
and operation to the Governor of the Bank of Korea. By 1981, the NIF is
expected to finance about 75 percent of total investment needs of major
industries. The resources of the Fund will be mobilized mainly (about three-
fourths) by issuance of NIF-Bonds and the remainder by direct subscription
by the Government. NIF-Bonds will be bought by various savings institutions
including banks and insurance companies and by private investors. The funds
will be on-lent through the banking system for investments in fixed assets
(about two-thirds) and for working capital needs (one-third) of major
industries.
43. The timely provision of long-term finance for the key industries
will depend to a large extent on the efficient operation of the NIF and the
tapping of other sources of funds such as Korea's three major development
finance companies - the Korea Development Finance Corporation (KDFC), KDB
and the Medium Industry Bank (MIB). These three institutions were responsible
for 64 percent of total medium and long term loans in Korea in 1973. The
Bank has already made four loans to KDFC and is contemplating a fifth; the
proposed loan will be the Bank's first to KDB which is the largest financial
intermediary in Korea; a loan for the MIB is also being considered in order
to support the Government's efforts to encourage the location of relatively
small industrial units in the rural areas and so increase off-farm employment
opportunities. The magnitude of the demand for term finance in Korea is
such that these three institutions, even if their operations increase sig-
nificantly, will continue to act in a complementary rather than a competi-
tive manner.
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PART IV - THE PROJECT
44. A report entitled "Appraisal of Korea Development Bank" (No.
592a-KO, dated February 26, 1975) is being distributed separately. A Loan
and Project Summary is attached as Annex III. Negotiations were held in
Washington from January 27 - February 4, 1975 with a Korean delegation led
by Mr. W.T. Shim, KDB's Deputy Governor.
The Company
45. The KDB was established in 1954 as a fully owned Government bank
and assumed the functions, assets and obligations of the Industrial Bank of
Korea which had been operating since 1918. KDB's role in its first few
years consisted essentially of helping in the reconstruction and rehabili-
tation of industry which had been severely disrupted during the Korean war.
However, by the late sixties KDB had become considerably more "development-
oriented" in its approach. In the first, post-war phase of its existence,
KDB restricted its activities largely to making local currency loans to fi-
nance enterprises engaged in power generation, coal mining and textile manu-
facture. In recent years it has broadened its activities to include the
provision of finance for virtually all the industrial sub-sectors.
46. In order to achieve its primary objective of promoting the indus-
trial development of the nation, KDB's functions consist of: making long-
term loans (in both local and foreign currency) to public and private indus-
trial firms; extending working capital loans (in local currency) to existing
clients; underwriting and guaranteeing debentures issued by public and private
enterprises; making equity investments and underwriting share issues; extend-
ing guarantees (both in local and foreign currency), and providing foreign
exchange banking services for its clients and Government enterprises. In
addition, KDB performs an important function by temporarily retaining the
majority interest in a number of Government-sponsored projects and eventu-
ally selling shares to private investors after improving their performance.
KDB also carries out statistical surveys, conducts economic and industrial
research, undertakes engineering surveys and business analyses and provides
managerial assistance for the projects it sponsors. On occasion, it has
been asked by the Government to advise on major economic policy issues and
assist in the formulation and execution of government projects.
Policies and Functions
47. Although the Government is KDB's sole shareholder and appoints the
Board of Executive Directors its policies are developed independently within
the framework of overall economic priorities enunciated by the Government.
Operational planning is done through an annual operational program which is
essentially a statement of projected sources and uses of funds for a one
year period. Significant amendments to KDB's operating procedures, its
by-laws and annual budget are subject to the Government's approval. The
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Government also takes the basic decisions with regard to very large projects
of national priority for which it provides the funds although KDB does
influence project-formulation in such cases and has the right to refuse to
finance projects which do not meet its standards and criteria. Decisions
in connection with KDB's guarantee operations are taken by a ministerial
level committee. KDB has full autonomy in respect of the projects which
it finances from the funds raised independently of the Government. Until
1969, KDB was completely dependent on the Government for its foreign
currency resources. This position changed when the Asian Development Bank
(ADB) made its first loan of $10 million to KDB in 1970. Since then, over
95 percent of KDB's foreign currency resources have been obtained directly
by the institution. KDB will have complete independence and autonomy in
making decisions with regard to projects to be financed from the proceeds
of the proposed loan.
48. KDB's operations are governed by the KDB Act, KDB's By-Laws, Oper-
ating manuals and a Policy Statement. The first Policy Statement was adopted
by the KDB Board in 1970. It summarized principles defined in the other
documents and added a few new ones. It contained the usual "financial pru-
dence" limits on its operations (e.g. limits on its total equity investments
and equity investment in a single enterprise, limit on total assistance to
any single enterprise, etc.). However, the 1970 Policy Statement allowed
KDB to exempt from the various limits all transactions relating to public
sector projects and projects benefiting concerns in which KDB held equity.
It also defined some of the limits in terms of KDB's net worth and "quasi-
equity" 1/ whereas, in fact, KDB had no "quasi-equity". As of June 30, 1974,
64% of KDB's total portfolio was accounted for by the "exceptional" projects.
The 1970 Policy Statement has now been revised to provide forla uniform
financial discipline for all projects for which KDB assumes the risk; ex-
ceptions, which are expected to be very rare, to the various limits would
still be permitted on the basis of the merits of individual cases. The
revised Policy Statement also contains a new clause emphasizing that KDB
shall follow sound financial policies, levy financial charges to cover not
only all expenses but also to build adequate reserves, etc. The adoption of
the revised Statement by KDB's Board is expected shortly and has been agreed
as a condition of effectiveness of the proposed Bank loan.
Management and Organization
49. KDB is administered by a full-time Board of Executive Directors
composed of the Governor, the Deputy Governor (both of whom are appointed
by the President of the Republic upon the recommendation of the Minister of
Finance) and seven Directors (who are appointed by the Minister of Finance
upon the recommendation of the Governor). There is also an Auditor appointed
by the Minister of Finance. Historically, all appointments to the Board, ex-
cept that of the Governor, have always been made by means of promotion from
within KDB thus insuring that the Board is composed of experienced profes-
sionals.
1/ KDB defines "quasi-equity" as those portions of Government loans to
it which are repayable after 15 years though not subordinated.
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50. KDB has more than 1,700 staff members of whom about a third can
be considered as being in the professional cadre. About a fifth of the
total staff is located in its 9 branches throughout Korea and its 2
Representative Offices in New York and Tokyo. About 200 of the professional
staff have been trained in Japan or the USA. Most of the Department Directors
have served KDB for many years. Professional staff are recruited just after
finishing college through open competitive examination and they usually spend
their entire career with KDB. It has a systematic training and career devel-
opment program for staff at all levels.
Operations and Resources
51. During its 20 years of operation, KDB's total loan commitments
have amounted to Won 659 billion (US$1.4 billion equivalent). Over 85
percent of this amount has been committed during the six years ending
December 31, 1974, reflecting an acceleration in its operations in recent
years. Total outstanding loans amounted, at the end of December last year,
to over Won 426 billion ($878 million equivalent) relating to 2,070 projects;
of this amount Won 394 billion ($812 million equivalent) for 1,773 projects
were for local currency loans; foreign currency loans amounted to Won 32
billion ($66 million equivalent) for 297 projects. KDB's foreign currency
lending operations began in 1960 when it assumed responsibility for the use
of a line of credit given to the Government by USAID. Since then, as
indicated in paragraph 40 above, KDB has obtained resources for foreign
currency lending from the Asian Development Bank (3 loans totalling $60
million), two syndicated Bank loans of $25 million and $80 million and a
recent loan of $19 million from Abu Dhabi. Nearly all foreign currency
funds obtained from ADB and the U.S. Agency for International Development
have been used to finance equipment purchases; the two loans obtained from
foreign commercial banks have been used largely to make domestic currency
loans.
52. One deficiency of KDB's usually competent appraisal procedures
relates to the fact that it does not routinely undertake a thorough appraisal
of the economic aspects of the projects it considers. Its staff does, how-
ever, have the professional capability to make such analyses. KDB will
include an economic rate of return analysis for all sub-projects to be
financed from the proceeds of the proposed loan and involving financing of
more than $750,000. The timing for the application of this kind of analysis
for the vast majority of all of KDB's operations would be discussed during
the course of the first Bank supervision mission for this loan.
53. KDB has a majority share holding in a few companies. It holds
equity amounting to about Won 24 billion ($49 million equivalent) in seven
concerns 1/. In order to reduce its exposuare in these companies (except
1/ Two of the companies - the Readjustment Corporation (RC) and the
Korea Industrial Leasing Company (KIL) - are regarded as "permanent"
subsidiaries of KDB and represent an extension of its corporate
functions.
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for RC and KIL) KDB and the Government have agreed that the former will
not increase its holdings in companies in which it has a majority share
%olding at present and that it will divest itself of its present holdings
as soon as 4t prudently car.. KDB has also agreed as a general rule, not
.o acquire more than 50 percent of the paid-up capital of any single company
il- the Eoture, These measures are reflected in the amended Policy Statement.
54. KDB;s guarantee operations amount to over twice the size of its
lozn and investment operations. In the 6 years ending December 31, 1974,
total guarantees issued by KDB amounted to Won 1,616 billion ($3.3 billion
equtvalent); total guarantees outstanding at the end of December 1974
amnounted to Won 1,311 million ($2.4 billion). If guarantees are included in
its debts. KDB's debt/equity ratio would be 11.7:1. Moreover, some of
the giuarantees issued by KDB are very large, e.g., as of June 30, 1974, the
fourteen largest guarantees represented almost 70 percent of total outstanding
guarantees as of that date and the range was W 11.2 billion to W 201 billion
($25 million to $414 million). Although the delinquency rate so far has
been negligible, the existing potential risk to KDB is considerable and
could seriously affect KDB's long-term creditworthiness and financial
soundness. Yet a complete elimination of KDB's guarantee function, or
even a severe curtailment of it, would not be in the broader interests of
the country. Korea needs and will long continue to need large inflows of
foreign capital, and KDB is in a good position to facilitate such inflows
by continuing to offer guarantees. On the other hand, KDB's risk needs to
be reduced, particularly as in most guarantee operations the decisions are
made by a ministerial level Committee and not solely by KDB. In order to
safeguard KDB against the excessive risks associated with its guarantee
operations, a "Guarantee Release Arrangement" has been worked out between
the Government and KDB, covering more than 80 percent of the total outstand-
ing guarantee portfolio. This Arrangement provides that the Government
shall take the steps necessary to enable KDB to meet all of the obligations
falling due under any default covered bv the Arrangement. Further, as and
when the Government and KDB reach the conclusion that the defaulting party
will not be able to meet its obligations, the Government shall assume all
Luture obligations of KDB under the guarantee contract. In view of this
Guarantee Release Arrangement, it is appropriate to exclude the guarantees
covered under the Arrangement from KDB's debt. Taking this into account,
KDB's debt/equity ratio, at the end of December last year, was 3.3:1.
55, KDB's total investment in the Korea Electric Company (KECO) - the
almost wholly Government-owned electricity generating and distribution company
- amounted, as of June 30, 1974 to Won 134.5 billion ($277.1 million). KDB's
loans to KECO (amounting to Won 132.7 billion - $273.3 million) accounted for
nearly 37 percent of the former's total outstanding loan portfolio. In order
to protect KDB against potential risks, KDB and the Government have entered
into an arrangement whereby the Government has undertaken to reimburse KDB
in the event of a default on KECO's part.
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Financial Results
56. KDB's overall profitability is low because the Government, which
is the sole shareholder, regards it mainly as a purely developmental agency
and not a profit-making institution. KDB's profits are tax-exempt and it
is not required to pay any dividends.
57. KDB's interest rate structure has been influenced by the role it is
expected to play. The interest rates on equipment loans in domestic currency
range from 7.5 percent to 15.5 percent and those on foreign currency loans from
9 to 10.5 percent with the sub-borrower assuming the exchange risk. The eco-
nomic cost of capital in Korea and the increasing cost of KDB's own foreign
resources suggest that the interest rate structure needs revision. However,
this is a question which needs to be addressed in the context of interest-rates
applied for all term lending in the country. The Government is reviewing
the level of interest rates and in particular the foreign exchange lending
rates for all credit intermediaries. The matter will be discussed with the
authorities during the course of discussions (scheduled for April this year)
on the draft report of the economic mission which recently returned from
Korea. The minimum interest rate on sub-loans made under the proposed
loan would be the Bank's rate plus 2 percent with the exchange risk being
borne by the sub-borrower.
Economic Impact of KDB's Operations
58. KDB plays a predominant role in term financing in Korea. In 1973,
it accounted for a little under half of all medium- and long-term loans made
by the banking sector; it directly financed 8 percent of total fixed capital
formation and 16 percent of total fixed investment in the manufacturing sector.
Its clients account for about 40 percent of Korea's total exports of manufac-
tures.
59. In 1972, enterprises assisted by KDB accounted for about a fourth
of total industrial employment and output in the country; by the end of
1972, projects assisted by KDB had created 250,000 jobs.
60. An analysis of a sample of KDB projects indicates that they had
highly satisfactory economic rates of return, which in most cases exceeded
the financial rates of return; moreover in all cases the economic rate of
return exceed 12 percent, which the Bank staff considers a reasonable
estimate of the opportunity cost of capital in Korea. These results are
not surprising since Korea's industrial development policies have beer.
highly successful and KDB's close adherence to them has enabled it to fi-
nance economically sound projects.
Audit
61. KDB's accounts are audited by its Government appointed inter-
nal auditor who is a permanent member of its Board. At the request of the
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Bank, KDB engaged the services of outside auditors, who have given an
unqualified report for 1973. KDB's accounts will be audited in future
by independent qualified auditors satisfactory to the Bank.
Future Operations and Resource Requirements
62. Although the impact of the energy crisis has caused some slowing
down of Korea's rate of growth and has affected export performance, it is
likely that in the longer-term Korea will be able to adhere to the growth
path of the last decade. Industry will have to continue to play an impor-
tant role in Korea's growth efforts, and it is expected that the manufactur-
ing sector will have to contribute a significant proportion of incremental
output and will, in turn, require a high level of investment in the next
decade if Korea is to achieve her growth targets. Because of its size, its
competent management and staff, and its development oriented policies, KDB
will have a crucial role to play in aiding Korea's continuing economic de-
velopment.
63. KDB's operational forecasts for the 1975-79 period show that it
will commit a total of Won 108.5 billion ($2.2 billion equivalent) in
loans and investments. The results of a recent KDB survey of the credit
needs of its clients indicates that the projected volume of operations
is likely to be restricted, if at all, by resource considerations rather
than by any lack of demand for KDB's assistance.
64. The share of foreign currency loans in the total mix of loans is
projected to increase gradually from 10 percent in 1973 to 15.8 percent in
1974 and to 19.4 percent in 1975. This reflects the anticipation of a
change in the pattern of the financing of imports rather than a change in
the nature and composition of projects to be financed. In the past, on
average, 27 percent of KDB's domestic currency resources was used for the
procurement of imported equipment and machinery. (Foreign exchange is
made available for authorized imports by the Korean Government against
equivalent payment in domestic currency). In view of the large demand for
its domestic currency funds, KDB proposes to use foreign currency loans to
an increasing extent to finance the import needs of its sub-projects.
65. Given Korea's rapid industrial growth and its increasing capacity
to supply capital and intermediate goods to satisfy domestic demand for
them, the need for domestic currency funds on the part of KDB's clients
is likely to remain at a high level. Therefore, KDB intends to use
only its borrowings from such international institutions as Kreditanstalt
fur Wiederaufbau, ADB and the Bank to finance foreign currency loans, while
funds to be raised through borrowings from foreign commercial banks and
issuance of Industrial Finance Debentures (IFD's) in foreign currency would
be converted to augment the domestic currency resources of KDB. During
negotiations for the proposed loan, the Government confirmed that it would
take steps to ensure that the year to year rollover of these IFD's would be
achieved since a significant part of KDB's reserves are obtained by the
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issuance of these nominally short-term securities. Moreover, KDB has taken
a policy decision, with the knowledge of the Government, to raise a greater
proportion of its resources through issuing more of its long-term debentures
in foreign capital markets rather than short-term debentures in the domestic
market. The Government has also agreed to guarantee KDB's debentures issued
in the foreign capital markets. During the two years ending December 31,
1976, KDB's total additional commitments (loans and investments) are projected
at about Won 385.7 billion (approximately $795 million equivalent). Including
an addition of about Won 35 billion ($72 million equivalent) to maintain its
satisfactory liquidity (actual investment in liquid assets as of December 31,
1974 was Won 31 billion; $64 million), KDB's total resource needs to the end
of 1976 total about Won 421 billion ($868 million equivalent). KDB's
business forecasts are conservative and should be attainable unless there
is an unexpected setback to the Government's or KDB's efforts to raise resources.
Between January 1975 and December 31, 1976 KDB plans to raise total resources of
Won 374.4 billion ($772 million equivalent) as follows:
Source of Funds Amount
(Won billion) ($ million)
Increase in paid-in capital 11.5 23.7
Borrowings from:
Government 59.8 123.2
NIF 122.2 251.7
IRF 11.5 23.7
Foreign commercial banks 38.8 /a 80.0
Issuance of IFD 66.0 lb 136.0
KfW (DM 15 million) 3.0 Ia 6.2
ADB 32.5 Ia 67.0
IBRD 29.1 /a 60.0
Total 374.4 771.5
/a In foreign currencies.
/b To be issued partly in foreign currency.
66. To the new resources referred to above should be added the uncom-
mitted balance (W 45.2 billion - $93.1 million) of resources available as
of December 31, 1974, which would give a total of W 419.6 billion - close to
the estimated net requirement of the period.
67. KDB intends to use the proceeds of the proposed Bank loan princi-
pally for projects in the private manufac~.uring sector although public sector
projects will also be eligible to receive Bank funds. Individual sub-loans
financed from the proceeds of the proposed loan will not normally exceed
$4 million in order to ensure that a reasonable number of sub-projects
benefit. A free-limit of $750,000 with an aggregate free limit of $18 mil-
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lion has been agreed upon during negotiations; this will ensure that the
Bank will review sub-projects accounting for about 70 percent of the proceeds
of the proposed loan.
Justification
68. Korea's ability to make the adjustments necessitated by the dete-
rioration in its terms of trade, caused largely by the high prices it has had
to pay for energy imports since late 1973, will be a crucial determinant of
the success of its efforts to sustain a high growth rate. Industrial growth
will remain one of the most important elements in the economy. The Govern-
ment's overall economic and industrial policies (which are outlined in Annex I
and Part III above) and, in particular the increased emphasis on the develop-
ment of the capital and intermediate goods industries, are appropriate for the
situation in which Korea is placed at present. KDB's organization, competent
staff and its relations with the Government and the business community make
it particularly suitable for providing finance for these types of projects.
KDB has processed a large number of projects each year and has played an
important role in the industrial development process of the country. Its
investments are economically sound and have contributed significantly to
employment. The average investment per worker of KDB's projects has been
US$17,000 including some very capital intensive projects. The average
capital cost per new job compares favorably with the experience of other
DFC-financed sub-projects in the region.
69. For the future, KDB's continued growth is not expected to be
constrained by a lack of demand for the financing and other services it
offers. The main objective of the Bank loan in addition to the provision
of finance for industrtial investment is to help KDB to expand its operations
on an economically and financially sound basis by improving its appraisal
standards, overall planning and financial management. The Bank's technical
assistance is considered essential towards this end. The Government shares
this view and has specifically expressed the wish that the Bank extend
its support of DFCs in Korea, which has been confined to lending to KDFC,
to include KDB and MIB - the two other major sources of long-term industrial
finance.
PART V - LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND AUTHORITY
70. The draft Loan Agreement between the Bank and the Korea Development
Bank, the draft Guarantee Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the
Bank, the report of the Committee provided for in Article III, Section 4(iii)
of the Articles of Agreement of the Bank and the text of a Resolution approv-
ing the proposed loan, are being distributed to the Executive Directors
separately.
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71. I am satisfied that the proposed loan would comply with the Articles
of Agreement of the Bank.
PART VI - RECOMMENDATION
72. I recommend that the Executive Directors approve the proposed
loan.
Robert S. McNamara
President
by J. Burke Knapp
Attachments
March 7, 1975
ANNEX I
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COSEDRY DATA - KOREA
AuRA POPULATION DENSITY
~847 k. 32.4 million (mid-1972) 725 Per kon2 of stable land
SOCIAL INDICATORS
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the latestIy yers. Lates6t periods mrine inprinciple to distribution by age and sea of -atio...l populations.
the et 956-h or166-70; the laen yor nPrn /6 Protoin etandrds (-equire,ots) foe all .o.ntrie, .. ..5tah-
ci plehto ~1960 and 1970. lished by UDOA Enononit Rasea.e-h Service provide for a miniu
lTh Pr Capital GNP netinato Is at market pcioes for aloao f 60 gram of total proteIn par day, sod 20 gram of
yer .ther tha- 1960, calculated by the saecnerin aimal and pu1se protein, of which 10 grone should ha animal
L teohnique aa the 1972 Norld Rank Atlas. protein. These otndeds are somehat lowe than those of 75
/2 Aveaanne odagtr pew nof raprodu-tive gram of total protoin and 23 arom of animal protein as a
ager.g aveofd.htr pr_rage for the world, proposed by PAO In the Third World Pond
/3 Popula:tion geoth raten ace if the decades endiog In Survoy.
L 1960 and 1970. L Som studies have suggested that crude death rates of ohldro-
/4 Ratio of population under 13 and 65 and over to pnpc1a- ages 1 through 4 may ho need no a first apprnination indan of
tinno aIges 15-64 fon age dependa..oy ratio and to labot mainutritio..
forc of aga15- 64 for eomt depend en.ry ratio. /0 Percentage on-nlied of cnrreapondiog population of school age
/5 PAR refac standard e repre..e.n physiologi-a1 re- as defined for nac h c...try.
quiemate for noma ac.tivity and hesith, taking
/n Canputod by applying to the 1970 fignee th. gromth rate of GNP per capita Io real tarm from 1960 to 1970; /b 1972;
/4 1962; /d 1965-70 UN estimate; I. Derived from Sample Survey estimates (240,000 persons), enuludiog 17 aastnro prov-
ines If 19711 4 16; / b 1965-67;/ 907; / Seoul c ity and ounicipalitien of 5,000 or mere
inhahitanta; /b Ove 10,000 population; Li Administrative oantare of provinee and dDstricts ("Vilayet" and lace""
Le.ra; / Cities ("Shi") having 30,000 am mer inhabitants; /n 1930-55; Ia 1964-June 1974; Ia 86 nercent
L being lORe; /4 Employed labor faroes; /4 15 years ond ovr; L. Wage and salary ina- of housholds;
/tH .ousehoIds; L. Urban only; 
1
y Disposa.ble -itm;L. Number of the regis tee ots .11 working in th, country;
I- nclding a..ais tnt nose ad nidwive; / 1989; In Eetia,tn; /ao 1964-66; lab Data on vooneional eduotion
refertopbln oho1e and innlodes technical edction atth post-secon.dary leve; Da Rfinitian unhkown
/ad Peron si. easod adovr who telthe censustakersthat tIny con read and write; e Data refer no households
/a OtI piped inalde; II& Icelda or -acide; /ab Percntge of dwel1lnga with electric lighting; /al 1964;/4.) 1955-60; /ab TeeY yern and over.
Japer has boon- naetedasnobjecnive country due en the similarity of th. presen.t Korean economic structrur to that
ofJapnt the nid-flitfe (with the san prinoipal cnut base, i.a., afficleot, industrious, cheap labor and heavy
r-1ao on7 imported raw mter!iaa. Moroe, ar,gri-ultura, transport, and other seotorn of the ec-onoy have siIlar
char accrrll Kraas a,i ins Lon-Term Plan (1972-01), a patter of industrial devlopment which in not
very diff-ro from tha one Japan pursue.d with great .ucc... In the iletie..
14 February 24, 1975
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ECONOMIC DEVELOPM8 SIATA IhEET
-o.sat. to millie,. of U.. olae
Artual Projected ~~~~~~ ~~~~1960- 1965- 1970- 1973-
196Q im ~ j 193 17 179 1965 19 70 1975 1979 1960l 1970 1979
NTITOSI ~ACCf5J2TS 3-erAeae r16-9fln xhnegtsA-g.rx .. Ina ln-,tb Rate A, Percet of TIY
D-.-ta Plodors 3,167.6 4,143.0 7,252.0 9,760.8 11,766.2 16,306.2 6.5 10.8 10.2 
8.9 100.7 100.1 101.6
41Sos (ro.., 1-on. of Trade (2-) -6 6 24 0 -66 -142.2 -318.7 -251.4 
__:_I -02 -0.c. -1.6
T
roDo 0.o.icI_o bom : 724. 9,610.6 11,447.5 16,054.8 6.5 1.9 9.6 8.9 100.0 
100.0 1(00.
T.- (-6r. liPS) 337.3 548.4 7,542.5 2,766.7 3,511.7 4,499.0 10.2 31.' 
101.4 0.5 10.7 29.6 28.0
Oxeotla ansoel SlOat to ~~~~113.1 302.5 1,301,7 .2~,53,0 _9 0 4.566.l 21.7 34.0 21.0 10.3 3.6 10.0 28.0
Oro,-,Cap -224.2 .21.5.9 -840.8 -230.7 .116.7 
67.0 1.1 79.0 -35.0 - .7.1 -11.6 0.4
Csoa5O E.Peditoe 3,075.5 3,862.3 5,926.2 7,726.9 9,247.5 
12,355.0 4.6 9.0 9.3 8.2 92.3 01.0 77.0
bos,-,~~so.os (ccl. tock,) ~ 309.7 702.6 2,158.0 2,190.5 2,321.1 3.633,3 17 .9 
5.5 1.3 8.8 9.8 29.0 22.6
85.5 456.7 1317.21 1,959.0 12,204. 1 3,700.3 40.0 73.5 10.8 11.2 
2.7 10.2 23.0
Ia s. ls,od 329.9 663.7 1,03. 2024.0 2,14.9 3,467.5 
15.0 17.7 7.8 9.4 1. 20.8 21.6
CepIi aI C,'-(s ~~~~~ ~~~70.0 73.0 500.  1,140.0 1,527.0 2,470.5 0.6 51.4 21.0 13.6 16.3 29.0 24.2
IOtcSO,,l2 G,-d. icol ucd90.0 110.3 404.0 1,477.9 2,02b.0 
3,060.0 4.1 395 38.0 12.9 21.0 20.4 29.9
uls ndReltd Maeil 1.0 31.0 136.0 387.0 1.307,0 2,138.0 
0.0 34.5 57.0 33.0 7.2 0 (.0 20.9
01.h,c P-srOleam 28.0 79 0 133.0 380.0 1,287.0 
2,0996.0 0.6 35. 5 570 33.0 6.5 (67 20.3)
t-lSeSliOGoods 23-8. 243 0 82.0 1 ,220.0 1k.650, 2 .._60 .4 0. 20.7 14.7 13.1 
55.5 43.0 25.0
_T s il l5esh .di'e I.Port. (sifl 429.O4' 457.0 1,982.0 4,240.9 6,510.0 10,728.0 1.3 
34.4 26.7 15.8 100.0 100.0 100.0
P,,na,4 Prssdurls cod .oIs) 37.0 64.0 131.0 314.0 337.0 362.4 11.6 15.4 
20.6 2.4 67.3 14.9 4.4
Is d Olald Maea n3.0 2.0 9.0 50.0 43.0 
75.0 -7.8 35.1 36.7 4.1 5.4 1.0 0.8
15.0 109.0 738.0 2 84. 4336~, 0 87 48.7 46.8 42.5 
16.5 _27.3 04.1 _94.8
. ,op-ron (lob) 55.0 175.0 078.0 3,212.0 4,716.0 8,311.0 26.2 
30.6 40.0 17.2 100.0 100.0 100.0
1O.-i-o ...d order Trade . 5.0 34.0 234.0 290.0 330.0 
.. 46.5 50.4 5.1
51-0,.11ij,< T-ad lod m-o Ave--a 1967-69 - 100-
E,s ,P, , Ido 89.2 87.5 100.0 150.0 169.0 511.9 
2.7 0.5 6.2
innp,,c.. lIars lo leo 1~~~~~04.0 103.0 100.0 153.0 195.0 
23. -05 0. 89 76
TerosofIcsl lnd- 85.0 84.9 100.0 98.0 86.7 
90.7 -0.5 3.4 -3.0 -1.3
I ,_s2sls Iod_o 13.6 36.9 1503.6 324.3 406.4 542.9 
22.0 33.0 16,1 9.0
Vk.4(1E A-DOtI BY StOTOR Annu.l Iat at16-6 rcs ohoa so
A 1~~~~~~~~~~,303.4 1.694,0 2,075.2 2,226.5 2,431.4 2832.3 
5.3 3.8 3.7 4.1 45.0 31.0 70.0
lods.scc ano naniog ~~~~~311.2 540.0 1,318.5 2,241.6 3,000.2 4,556.9 11.7 19.7 17.8 12.5 10.0 70.0 33.0
Scromoc ~~~~~~~~ ~~~1,306.1 1,7_15.0 .162.0 4,249.1 4.873.9... 6.632,0 5.6 13.0 9.1 9.3 45.0 49.0 47.0
T-ta 2,920.7 3,939.0 6,505.7 8,717.2 10,306.0 14,021.2 
6.1 I0.5 9.6 10.0 100.0 106.0 100.0
Cs, R- I . scp I 380.4 394.6 1,212.1 1,202.4 1,695.4 
2,990.3 0.3 29.7 7.0 16.4 13.0 19.0 10.0
cu-sc Co,nstr 2. 7 8803.2 1 0_10 0 1 2_9 
5 5 2.491,9 .74 100 29 16 3 14.0 14.0 15.0
O'sdcrsdcs Snosogs .~~~~ ~~32.0 20.4 328.9 192.4 399.9 498.4 .. 73.0 3.9 17.2 .1.0 .5.0 3.0
Olb", 2,0.1. Iets ao a1. 49.7 185. .... 
24.0 27.0 . 1.0 3.0 2.0
ms,4) cisc icr bsoestn.sot ~~108.2 165.9 472.6 364.0 571.0 747.6 0.9 23.2 3 .9 12'.7' 4.0 7.0 4.0
DETAIL ON A6t 1 I967-69 Prl-,O As Percentsof Total
CcO6RE7l FYPENI2lTm1E ltTAII.4 Antoal tot. 
POOI.C SE To11L/ plan Plan Plan PI-
(u .Tota ms,rcntE-d.> 1965 290 17 92 12LN.VESTMENT 
P .ROCRAMS (1967-71) (1973-81) (1967-71) (1973-81)
Ed,,c.sr, on ~~~~~ ~~~~11.0 15.0 7.0 16.0 10.0 S-olal SOr,to-s 317 .116 2 9.0 42.0
010cc 4oc 2.. S r.aices ~~~~10.0 14.0 11.0 14.0 15.0 AgCator- 64 2,835 6.0 73.0
AR,,,t ,10.0 9.0 0.0 5.0 
7.0 Mlo,ng a-d 9(nfctrn 2 1,094 9.0 9.0
Os,Ec Ec io,1 Se-olc- 29.0 16.0 10.0 20.0 14.0 
P-.o 26 0 54
Adn-n105- so and DeIro- 36.0 37.0 28.0 77.0 29.0 
T--op-rI .,d
012cc 1~~~ ~ ~~~~ ~~~~~0.0 9.0 -A - 18.0 1 .0 7.0C Cso---4sa i0- 429 3,167 43.0 26.0
T-1i C.-,5 F,p-odit.-e 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
ot,ho, 129 51 12.0
Toto1 1,107 12.233 100.0 100.0
4OLEC2CD 19:mIAT2lgS 1960. 1965- 1970- 1973- 
FINAN1C080-
1965 1970 1975 1079 Pu-blic Savings 1,4941 69.0
uo55.~~~~~~~c 4220 7~~~~~~~~.2 2~ .4- 2.0 7.0 Pr-gr- ,Id 
405 . 22.0
la~~~socs TI ass a,,tyT' ~~~~~~~1.6 2. 1.1 1.0 F.,,sclgo .. Anruoo (Not, 61 . 3.0
Ma9,,I i sn---s S-nigs Rare 0.0 .3 0.22 0.20! Dornstii B orr2nsainN l t) 122. 60
Masis-l NO5.,o-1 Oo-in, Rate 0.2,9 0.30 0.10 0. 25• 
Total 2,149 . 100.0
LA800 (0644 031D Total Labo- F.-o Va1,,o Add,,d Ps,, W-k-e (1967-69 
rlfc-n & 0a6.Raes
(LirPrpn PER _00030E8 10 Milli... 7 of Total 1960-70 In0.. U slus 
7 t nrj~ 1960-70
16 1970 1960 1970 Gro,th Rats 1960 1970 1990 1974 Cr-th Rate
Aoci,,,1',,rc ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~4.6 4.8 66 11 0,.4 202 419 60 62 4.0
0.5 1.3 7 23 10.1 563 996 135 
145 5.8
Soromocs ~~~~ ~ ~ ~~~ ~ ~ ~~~1.9 3, 27 36 0.1 701I 930 169 13 7 2.8
Total o~~ ~ ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~.0 9.6 100 100 3. 416 602 100 100 5.8
no vIable a/ 1962 d/ Fiscal Plan,
,0aplobe 6/ C-ot-alIonnn B ...ed on three-a averge
arstl esLat Offcial. (EPB) E/ 1973 Is included
a -olded in Social Se-t-r i/ Is-1od- c--et tranfer.(nt
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BALA1OEOP ATh8T M907010 ASSISTANCE AND0 DEBT
~emwt5 o oili ns f U.S. dollar At urot pr-ces
Actua1 Ftirated ProJect.d Or-tth Rat1969 19 70 97 1 17 2 1973 3 974 1975 1.976 i12.2 19 79 lOo 1573-1981
SUMMARY0 RAIANCE OP PAYMENTS
Eports (to-l. i1Fs) 1,113 1,341 1,587 2,205 4,048 5,045 5.714 6,499 7,760 9,711 12,971 15.7
I'orll ol 91 1l903 2.107 2.515 2,0 4.469 6,056, 6.827 7,686 8,987 10592 .Ij.fl 14.5flcoro Os- oneI 9 -790 -766 -928 -401 -412 -1,911 -1,113 -1,187 -1,227 -881 -229
Tnt-rest (vet) 7D"rect l-ocooo-t mc-oy -l -37 -91 -140 10 -167 -193 -286 -434 -604 -977 26.5
-40 -10 -60 -00 -83 -138 -186 21.2Workers'I RemIttanc 144) (33) (25) (19) - - - - - - --
- - .-~~~~~~~~~. 2~~~46 180 171 170 260 241 230 220 210 200 2001 -2.0
77----7-7 = 3-- 54 7 090 -- 37r 1537 DOT 97 -Z,sE: -1333 -:1 5-3 6 -1.503 -1.192 16-9
private Di-etloeure 16 30 56 47 149 209 210 275 300 350 425 14.0Officlial Capitall Grat, 36 122 131 -16 -- - - - --
Dinuvoot 666 422 593 721 093 1,027 1,135 1,425 1,615 1.766 1,539 10.5
____________ -Ill~~~~~~11 -05 -237 -26 -256 -243 -231 -247 -352 -154 -900 17.2
3357' 27 ~ 3 437 704 904 1,170 1,263 1.212 659 4.9
Ilcsisrocvorrto ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~17 78 33 49 52 04 85 187 122 133 116 10.6
-Elovaleersots -~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~~~3 -o 10 -9 -16 -10 -10 -19 ,,,26j .- 42~ .... 6.. 19.8
lot Diotoooaeeola ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~14 70 23 40 173' 66 67 80 96 91 40 .
scar i-born topIcal ~~~ ~~~77 249 224 -91 45 190 172 91 1972 197
lance is --coos so oroco -1~~ ~~62 -57 49 .455 -32 DEFp Aito 000T 0ERVIC010
Eror nd sslo 
-6 -16 6 41 - Pulcot Ou-t.& Di,,bro-d 0,480 1,050 2,097 2,500 3,025
-like . - - - ster-t em Pb1o Debt 32 61 90 92 102
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otbli 0 toil cans fa~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Ttal Public Debt Serolc 144 266 3 27 300 350
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FDA I/ 15 11 7 26 20 Total Debt lorelco (e_t) 149 279 349 331 301
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Osiri PtA liTtoral - - ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- As-los- en 83,cort Osr-n0g)0
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2-soipliorn ~~~~ ~~~ ~ ~~297 Isa 2 04 100 - PoIblio Debt S-rel- 12.9 19.0 20.6 14.0 0.0
asnt U Ion totuttona 116~ ~~ 11 1116 - OttfetlnOn13.4 20.8 272. 0 15.0 9.1tools 
- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- - -TDS.03i-t Ocret, Too 11 4.3 23.6 27.7 21.4 10.1
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KOREA
THE STATUS OF BANK GROUP OPERATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
A. Statement of Bank Loans and IDA Credits (as at January 31. 1975)
Loan or US$ Million
Credit Amount (less cancellations)
Number Year Borrower Purpose Bank IDA Undisbursed
Five loans and credits fully disbursed 24.7 39.7
600 1969 ADC Irrigation 45.0 8.0
151 1969 Republic of Education 14.8 3.3
Korea
669 1970 Republic of Railways 40.0 2.9
Korea
234 1971 Republic of Livestock 7.0 .4
Korea
735 1971 KDFC Dev. Fin. Co. 30.0 1.3
769 1971 Republic of Highways 54.5 1.4
Karea
283 1972 Republic of Irrigation 15.0 7.8
Korea
795 1972 ADC Irrigation 33.0 32.4
335 1972 Republic of Agricultural Cr. 10.5 3.9
Korea
863 1972 Republic of Railways 40.0 18.3
Korea
905 1973 KDFC Dev. Fin. Co. 40.0 11.6
906 & 1973 Republic of Education II 23.0 20.0 42.8
394 Korea
917 1973 Republic of Ports 80.0 77.9
Korea
942 1973 Republic of Seeds Production 7.0 6.9
Korea
953 1974 Republic of Tourism 25.0 25.0
Korea
956 1974 Republic of Highways II 47.0 34.2
Korea
994 La 1974 AFDC Agriculture 13.0 13.0
1070 - 1975 Republic of Secondary Cities 15.0 - 15.0
Korea
Total 517.2 107.0 306.1
of which has been repaid 11.8 0.3
Total now outstanding 505.4 106.7
Amount sold 2.0
of which has been repaid 0.8 1.2
Total now held by Bank and
IDA (prior to exchange adjustment) 504.2 106.7
Total undisbursed 270.8 35.3 7FT
/a Not yet effective
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B. STATEMENT OF IFC INVESTMNTS (as at January 31, 1975)
Amount in US$ million
Year Obligor Type of Business Loan Equity Total
1968 KDFC Development financing - 0.7 0.7
1969 Honam Silk Co. Textiles 1.4 0.3 1.7
1970 Atlas Paper Co. Pulp and paper 4.5 0.5 5.0*
1971 Korea Investment Capital market - 0.7 0.7
and Finance Corp. development
1973 KDFC Development Financing - 0.4 0.4
1974 Gold Star & Co. Electronic Products 16.0 1.3 17.3
Ltd.
1974 Korea Investment Capital market - 0.3 0.3
and Finance Corp. development
Total gross commitment 21.9 4.2 26.1
less cancellations, terminations,
repayments and sales 9.6 0.5 10.1
Total commitments now held by IFC 12.3 3.7 16.0
Total undisbursed X A
* Cancelled at the request of the Company
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PROJECTS IN EXECUTION 
-/
Loan No. 600 Pyongtaek-Kumgang Irrigation Project; US$45.0 million
Loan of May 23, 1969; Closing Date: December 31, 1976
The Project includes irrigation for about 35,000 ha, improvement
of drainage and roads, consolidation of paddy fields, benching of upland and
tidal land reclamation. Construction was delayed by a reorganization of the
executing agency and a delay in hiring consultants. The major project com-
ponents (two sea dikes, the main distribution system and pumping plants)
were largely completed by the end of 1974. Contracts for nearly all of the
remaining work have been awarded. Cost considerations have led to the exclu-
sion of about 5,000 ha of land from the project. Costs have risen from US$90
million at appraisal to about US$130 million largely because of the increased
costs of right-of-way, engineering, administration and land consolidation.
Preliminary estimates indicate increases in the price of rice will partially
offset the effects of higher costs and reduced irrigable area. The economic
rate of return is now estimated to be about 10 percent, compared with the
appraisal estimate of 14 percent. The implementing agency (ADC) has re-
viewed ways of economizing on the remaining work which should lead to some
marginal cost savings. About 82 percent of the Loan has been disbursed.
Construction is progressing satisfactorily and is scheduled for completion
by mid-1976.
Credit No. 151 First Education Project; US$14.8 million Credit
of June 4, 1969; Closing Date: December 31. 1975
This Project comprises: (a) the expansion and equipping of 27
technical, commercial and agricultural high schools, 5 post-secondary
higher schools and 4 university teacher training departments; and (b) 26
man-years of technical assistance and 20 man-years of overseas fellowships
to support the development of agricultural and technical education. Project
implementation, which was slow at commencement, has improved and the project
is now 12 months behind schedule compared with the 15 months delay estimated
a year ago. All civil works, furniture procurement, technical assistance
and fellowships have been completed; 70 percent of the equipment has been
procured and the remainder is expected to be delivered during 1975. The
Credit is expected to be fully disbursed by the present Closing Date.
1/ These notes are designed to inform the Executive Directors regarding
the progress of projects in execution, and in particular to report
any problems which are being encountered, and the action being taken
to remedy them. They should be read in this sense, and with the under-
standing that they do not purport to present a balanced evaluation of
strengths and weaknesses in project execution.
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Loan No. 669 Third Railway Project; US$40.0 million Loan and
Credit No. 183 US$15.0 million Credit of May 14, 1970; Closing Date:
December 31, 1975
The bulk of the Loan and Credit was earmarked for the purchase of
freight cars, diesel locomotives, and telecommunications and track mainte-
nance equipment. Progress is generally satisfactory except for delays in
the procurement of some microwave equipment which has been re-tendered.
Credit No. 234 Integrated Dairy Beef Development Project;
US$7.0 million Credit of February 11, 1971;
Closing Date: March 31, 1977
The development of about 700 small and medium-sized dairy farms
by providing long-term loans and the construction and operation of two
dairy products processing plants are the principal components of the
Project which also includes the provision of management and technical
services. Project execution has been satisfactory. To date, about 591
farmers have participated and farm loans of about US$4.5 million equivalent
have been approved. About 4,900 head of cattle have been purchased and two
dairy plants have been constructed and are in operation. The proceeds of
the Credit, except those earmarked for technical services, are expected
to be fully committed by the end of this month.
Loan No. 735 Third Korea Development Finance Corporation Project,
US$30 million Loan of May 14, 1971; Closing Date:
August 31, 1975
The Project is progressing satisfactorily. The Loan is fully
committed.
Loan No. 769 First Highway Project; US$54.5 million Loan of
June 29. 1971; Closing Date: November 30, 1975
The construction of approximately 370 km of national highways
between Jeonju and Busan was satisfactorily completed in December, 1973,
at a final cost about five percent above the appraisal estimate. Feasi-
bility studies and detailed engineering have been completed for 1,400 km
and 900 km of national highways, respectively. A study of road maintenance
and the establishment of a pilot maintenance organization formed the basis
of the creation of a country-wide Highway Maintenance Organization which is
being carried out under the Second Highway Project.
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z,oan No, 795 Yong San Gang Irrigation Project; US$33.0 million Loan
rredit iNo. 283 and US$15.0 million Credit of February 2, 1972; Closing
Date: S~emb~er_IO2ZL 7
This Project aims at transforming an area with the highest drought
f.eq.ency in Korea into one with year-round irrigation and crop diversifica-
tlo.t, Also, there will be increased production of high value crops such as
f;ruits and winter vegetables. Design work is proceeding satisfactorily and
tha work on four dams, the main canals and land consolidation has started.
Aiward of the three remaining major contracts anticipated for canals and land
coneolidation will be delayed until next summer, with construction to start
a'ter the rice harvest, i.e. roughly a year later than scheduled at appraisal.
T'he delay was caused mainly by financial difficulties attributed to price
escalation and design modification. The cost increases will be partially
compensated for by benefits attributable to the enlargement of the area to
be irrigated by about 1,400 ha.
Credit No. 335 Agricultural Credit Project: US$10.5 million
Credit of September 29, 1972; Closing Date:
September 1, 1976
The Credit supports a three year lending program to small farmers
to develop orchards, sericulture and mushroom production and to encourage
the breeding of poultry and swine. It also finances an organizational and
accounting study of the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF)
and the strengthening of its training facilities. The Project is progress-
ing satisfactorily and its disbursement is proceeding on schedule.
Loan No. 863 Fourth Railway Project; US$40.0 million Loan of
November 22, 1972; Closing Date: December 31, 1976
T'he main elements of the Project are: electrification of lines
in the Seoul suburban area; purchase of electric railcars and locomotives;
the completion of electrification of 350 km of line running from Seoul to
the northeastern part of Korea; track and bridge renewal; provision of yard
facilities; acquisition of passenger and freight cars; and improvement of
facilities for the maintenance and repair of motive power and rolling stock.
No major problems have been encountered; about 90 percent of the Loan pro-
ceeds have been committed.
Loan No. 905 Fourth KDFC Project; US$40.0 million Loan of June 13,
1973; Closing Date: December 31, 1977
The Project is progressing satisfactorily.
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Loan No. 906 Second Education Project; US$23.0 million Loan and
Credit No. 394 US$20.0 million Credit of June 13, 1973; Closing
Date: December 31, 1977
The Project provides equipment for and extensions to the buildings
of: 18 technical and 14 agricultural high schools; ten higher schools/junior
colleges for industrial, agricultural, fishery and nursing training; colleges
of agriculture, engineering and natural sciences in nine universities and a
merchant marine college; and ten junior teacher colleges and 12 colleges of
education. It also includes pre-investment studies on health and management
education. Project implementation has improved and is now six months behind
schedule compared with nine months a year ago. Construction and equipment
procurement are proceeding satisfactorily. Cost overruns on civil works,
to be financed by the Government, are expected to be large due to the recent
sharp increase in building construction costs. It is expected that the Proj-
ect will be completed on schedule.
Loan No. 917 Ports Project; US$80 million Loan of June 27, 1973;
Closing Date: June 30, 1979
The Project includes the provision of container and bulk cargo
facilities and equipment at Busan and coal piers and handling equipment
at Busan and Mukho. Some contracts for dredging and pier construction
have been awarded. The design-work and preparation of tender documents
for the remaining items are proceeding satisfactorily. Revised cost
estimates show an increase of about 30 percent over appraisal estimates.
A Phase II Port Development Study and consultants' services in connection
with the establishment of a "Korean Port Authority" are proceeding satis-
factorily.
Loan No. 942 Seeds Project; US$7.0 million Loan of November 16,
1973; Closing Date: December 31, 1978
The Project consists of: (a) the installation of five field crop
seed processing and storage facilities; (b) farm machinery for seed produc-
tion; (c) procurement of seasonal seed inventories through the operation of
a revolving fund; (d) seed testing laboratories and equipment; (e) crop
research (financed in part by USAID); (f) feasibility studies for irrigation
and area development; and (g) technical assistance. The Office of Seed Pro-
duction and Distribution was established in November, 1974. The Government
is finalizing a contract for consultant's services.
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Loan No. 953 Kyongju Tourism Project; US$25.0 million Loan of
January 4, 1974; Closing Date: December 31, 1978
The Project forms part of the first phase of the planned develop-
ment of the Bomun Lake resort near Kyongju. It provides for a multi-purpose
dam; an irrigation system for about 1,200 ha; improvement and expansion of
the water supply and sewerage and solid waste disposal systems for the city
of Kyongju and the resort area; installation of electrical supply and tele-
communication facilities for the resort area; the construction and/or re-
alignment of about 57 kms of roads; infrastructure including storm water
drainage, environmental sanitation, community facilities, a golf course, a
school for training hotel personnel; and a feasibility study for the devel-
opment of tourism on Cheju Island. The Loan was declared effective on May 6,
1974. Final design for almost all Project components is complete and the
first four contracts have been awarded.
Loan No. 956 Second Highway Project; US$47.0 million Loan of
January 25. 1975; Closing Date: December 31, 1977
The Project, which forms part of the Government's 1972-76 road
construction and paving program, consists of the construction, chiefly on
new alignments, of about 130 kms of highways; feasibility studies by con-
sultants of about 1,000 kms of national and provincial roads, followed by
detailed engineering where justified; and the procurement of highway main-
tenance and workshop equipment for the extension of a new highway mainte-
nance program from a pilot province to the remainder of the country. All
construction and paving contracts have been awarded.
Loan No. 994 Integrated Agricultural Products Processing Project;
US$13.0 million Loan of June 7, 1974; Closing Date:
June 30, 1979
The Project aims at integrating the on-farm production of com-
mercial crops for export with efficient hygienic processing facilities
using land that is presently idle or underutilized. It comprises (i)
on-farm development of asparagus, oak mushrooms and mushrooms; (ii) con-
struction of and improvements to facilities to process asparagus, oak
mushrooms, mushrooms and fruits; and (iii) technical assistance including
training of staff, services of consultants, etc. The terminal date for
effectiveness of the Loan has been extended to April 15, 1975, to provide
additional time for recruiting a Project Manager. The selection of a
proposed Project Manager has been approved and, consequently, the Loan
will be declared effective shortly.
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Loan No. 1970 Secondary Cities Regional Project; US$15.0 million
Loan of January 15, 1975; Closing Date: March 31, 1979
The principal aims of the Project are the establishment of an or-
ganizational framework for regional investment, planning and development and
to improve working and living conditions in the secondary cities of the less
developed Gwangju region. The main elements of the Project are: (i) housing
sites and services in the cities of Yeosu, Mogpo and Gwangju (370,384 m 2);
(ii) a fishery harbor complex with industrial processing zone (215,385 m )
in Yeosu; (iii) a city market in Suncheon City (33,160 m2); and (iv) access
roads i Yeosu and Mogpo (6.61 km). It also provides technical assistance
to strengthen regional planning and development, to improve the utilization
of existing water supply systems in the four cities, to assist the manage-
ment and operation of the fishery complex and to carry out feasibility
studies of project proposals identified under the UNDP-financed Phase II
Regional Study.
ANNEX III
LOAN AND PROJECT SUMMARY
Korea Development Bank Proiect
Borrower: Korea Development Bank (KDB)
Guarantor: Republic of Korea
Amount: $60.0 million
Interest Rate: Standard
Commitment Charge: Standard
Terms: Amortization to conform substantially to the
aggregate of the amortization schedules appli-
cable to the specific investment projects
financed out of the proceeds of the proposed
loan. The maximum repayment period would be
18 years, including three years of grace.
Purpose: The proposed loan would be used by KDB to make
sub-loans to finance direct imports for indus-
trial sub-projects during the period mid-1975
to mid-1977.
Estimated
Disbursements: Calendar Year US$ Million
1975 1.50
1976 27.00
1977 29.50
1978 2.00
Appraisal Report: 592a-KO dated February 26, 1975.
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